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IS THE 

RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 

A 

BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION? 



A 

KEEN 

ANALYSIS 

OF SITUATION 

IN SOVIET RUSSIA 




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Is The Russian Revolution 
A Bourgeois Revolution? 



In 1905-1906, after the first Russian Revolution, the 
question as to the social character and the part to be 
played by the next Russian Revolution was of great im- 
portance in the process of self-determination of the labor 
movement. The questions asked were: "Will it be a 
bourgeois or a proletarian revolution? Which class will 
lead it if it is to be a bourgeois revolution ? What will be 
the relations of this class to the other classes ?" 

Even the first revolution had settled many disputes in 
spite of the fact that it had not reached its goal. Although 
it was suppressed before it could decide upon vital ques- 
tions, the questions of power, it became absolutely clear 
that the bourgeoisie was a counter-revolutionary class 
which sought to enter into an agreement with the old 
Czarist regime for the perpetuation of the condition of 
half serfdom in order to subdue the proletariat. Two 
cliasses proved to be revolutionary, the workers and the 
peasants. The workers were the leaders, the main driving 
force of the revolution. 

During the decade between the first revolution and that 
of 1917, the disputes over the character of the revolution 
gave place to definite questions dealing with the conditions 
for organizing the working class after the revolution, the 
question of social changes as a result of the first revolu- 
tion, and particularly the question dealing with the 
changes within the working class and with Stolypin's 
agrarian policy. The March and October revolutions, four 



years of Soviet rule and finally our new economic policy 
have restored the question of the character of our revolu- 
tion to the order of the day. The Mensheviks and their 
international friends, the Social-Democrats and Centrists. 
are madly howling over the new economic policy of the 
Soviet government, and are putting the following question 
to us : *'Why was all that necessary ? Does not the fact 
tha!; you Bolsheviki are compelled to restore the very 
capitalism you have destroyed, prove that it was a 
bourgeois revolution ?" 

It is necessary to answer this question if we ourselves 
wish to grasp the meaning of this four years' fight, and 
the significance of our new policy. Are we actually re- 
nouncing the past four years ? Is the Russian Revolution 
a proletarian one or is it a bourgeois revolution? 

First of all we must establish certain facts. We desig- 
nate all the revolutions from the Dutch uprising against 
Spanish tyranny up to the English and French revolu- 
tions, or more strictly speaking, up to the three French 
revolutions, as bourgeois revolutions, because their result 
was bourgeois rule, which meant a step towards its uni- 
versal triumph, and to the bourgeoisie's acquisition of 
power in all civilized countries. Not one of these revolu- 
tions was purely bourgeois ; v/e must take into considera- 
tion the classes that participated in them and the goals 
aimed at by these classes. The large landowning class 
played a considerable part in the Netherlands and even 
in the English revolution. Cromwell himself was a large 
landowner; he was backed by a considerable part of the 
big English landowners. At the same time, beginning 
with the English revolution we see that not only did the 
craftsman, the industrial worker and the young prole- 
tarian class which was just coming into existence, par- 
ticipate in the revolutions, but we even notice a slrong 
tendency to exceed the bounds set by the growing capi- 
talist system. The movements of Leweers, Digors and 
Chiliasten were proletarian democratic movements which 



strove towards instituting the Socialist order and that of 
collective ownership ; they sought the abolition of private 
property and capitalist competition. Considerable masses 
participated in these movements. To them Socialism was 
a religion. Even at that time Socialism represented a 
danger to the young capitalist order, and the bourgeoisie 
suppressed it with all the cruelty of which it is capable 
in defending its interests. Cromwell well understood the 
conflict between capitalism and this religious Socialism. 
In his speeches he fought against the latter with the same 
arguments which the bourgeoisie used against revolution- 
ary Socialism in the 19th century. 

During the French revolution and parallel with its 
development, the Socialist cUiTent gained strength in the 
depths of society; it was then represented by the party 
of the "Enrages", whose history has not yet been written, 
but which played a very important part in the events of 
1793 (the literature on this party is very poor) . Robes- 
pierre was an avowed and convinced opponent of this 
movement. In the pamphlets of the Girondist, Brissot, 
the representative of the commercial bourgeoisie of south- 
ern France, we find not only all the arguments with which 
the bourgeoisie later fought Socialism, but we also find 
the mad, raging hatred which is due to the recognition of 
the power of the Communists in the French revolution. 
These were backed by a considerable part of those who 
saved France in 1793. 

One of the reasons why the petty-bourgeois democrat 
Robespierre was overthrown, was that he had lost the 
working masses of Paris through his campaign against 
the "Enrages" and their defenders in the Paris Commune, 
like Chaumette. For the heads of Chaumette and Leroux, 
Robespierre paid with his own head. After he had lost 
connection with the working masses ^he could no longer 
instil fear into, nor be of any use to the Thermidorists of 
the young bourgeoisie of the French Revolution, which 
was gaining ground in the war against the feudal world. 
When the head of Robespierre fell amid joyous cheers of 



the speculators and the "Jeunesse doree", the suburbs of 
Paris were maliciously silent. 

In the revolution of 1789, and still more in the Revo- 
lution of 1848, the working class of France together with 
the artisans who joined it, was already a growing and 
threatening power which clearly understood the conflict 
of proletarian and capitalist interests. These masses who 
were not yet united by industries on a large scale and who 
did not yet have a party which could unite them by an 
idea, these masses who fought with a confused idea of 
the Socialist Republic, were already the driving power 
and the leaders of the revolution. The defeat of these 
masses in June was the defeat of the revolution. The 
bourgeoisie did not develop the revolution after their 
victory; it was rather the workers who did it. The bour- 
geoisie ended it and flocked to the standards of Napo- 
leon m. 

What is the significance of this historical reminiscence ? 

The existence of the bourgeoisie is a necessary condi- 
tion for a bourgeois revolution= In all bourgeois revolu- 
tions, however, the working class stepped into the histor- 
ical arena together with the bourgeoisie, for there is no 
bourgeoisie without a working class. At first the working 
class moved under the leadership of the bourgeoisie. 
Then, in the process of revolution, it became conscious 
of the clash of interests between itself and the bour- 
geoisie. It therefore attempted to exceed the bounds of the 
French revolution, the aims which the latter set in the 
fight for the working class and in the struggle for vaguely 
formulated Socialist principles. 

In 1896 Eduard Bernstein, who at that time was still 
considered a revolutionary Marxist, pointed out in his 
preface to Heritier's history of the French Revolution 
of 1848, that, due to the bourgeois character of the revo- 
lution, the working class should not have put any demands 
which exceeded the bounds of the bourgeois order. This 



he considered the great error committed by the working 
class. But the workers did not reduce their demands in 
the bourgeois revolutions. They understand Bernstein 
well. What Bernstein told them the representatives of 
the bourgeoisie socialism are always telling them. The 
workers could not withdraw their demands because they 
had come out of cellars and dogs' kennels and dirty work- 
shops. They were suffering and consequently could not 
calmly look on while the bourgeoisie was reaping the har- 
vest. They had to fight for their own interests and pur- 
sue their own aims, because they felt that it was they 
who had overthrown the old order and that the bour- 
geoisie- only wanted to modify their slavery. They had 
to go still further, for without doing so they would have 
been unable to defeat the old order. They succeeded in 
doing so only because they had exceeded the limits, of 
bourgeois interests. Friedrich Engels was right when 
he spoke of the historical law, according to which the 
revolutionary class puts demands to the leaders of a rev- 
olution which by far exceed the apparent possibilities of 
the particular moment, thus making the overthrow of 
the old order possible. Rosa Luxemburg was also right 
in her statement that in all bourgeois revolutions it was 
the proletarian communist efforts of the workers that 
constituted the power which made the overthrow of 
feudalism possible. 

This recognition of historical tendencies in every bour- 
geois revolution is a necessary condition for the theoret- 
ical comprehension of the fate of the Russian Revolution. 

In 1905, when disputes over the character of the Rus- 
sian Revolution were still going on, Trotzky rightly point- 
ed out that whether we wanted it or not, the working 
class would exceed the bourgeois limits of the revolution, 
because it would have to seize power, even though it 
might do so together with the peasantry, in order to end 
the bourgeois revolution and in order to overthrow the 
Czarist regime, and that in order to reach a practical 
solution in the questions of unemployment and lockouts, 

10 




11 



it would have to base and answer these questions upon 
its own interests, that is, upon Socialism. At that time 
Karl Kautsky, who now speaks like a Menshevik, agreed 
with Rosa Luxemburg that the Russian Revolution was 
at the same time a bourgeois and non-bourgeois or prole- 
tarian revolution, because, although it established the 
capitalist order on the land by leaving the land in the 
hands of the peasants, it must seek to establish Socialism 
in the cities. At that time Kautsky said that according 
to its position in history the Russian Revolution was the 
transition from the bourgeois to the proletarian revolu- 
tion. 

If the influence of the Russian Revolution was to let 
loose the revolutionary forces in Europe (and in Western 
Europe only a proletarian revolution is possible) the Rus- 
sian Revolution would be compelled to realize Socialism 
in its own peculiar way. 

Ten years after Kautsky had made these observations 
upon the driving forces of the revolution, the March 
revolution took place. The leaders of the proletarian 
vanguard, the Bolsheviki, were well aware of the petty 
bourgeois character of the Russian industries, and they 
therefore consciously attempted to limit the aims for 
which the proletariat fought by placing upon the order 
of the day, not Socialism, but the transition measures 
towards Socialism. Lenin's program in April, 1917,, had 
for its aim the bringing of the government machine into 
the hands of the workers' and the peasants' Soviets, and 
the nationalization of banks without doing away^with 
private property. Even after the workers and peasants 
had seized power the Soviet government made no attempt 
to expropriate the bourgeoisie, but rather to develop and 
organize the workers' control of industry. The working 
class, however, proceeded with dynamic force. It seized 
the factories and nationalized enterprises in the provinces 
against the will of the central government. This it did, 
not out of ignorance of the program of the Bolshevik 
Party, but because of the resistance of the bourgeoisie 



12' 



which attempted to sabotage the workers' control or to 
hide the supplies necessary for running the industries. 
The workers had to get hold of the bourgeoisie by the 
neck. Even if there had been no economic necessity for 
this move, the class which had overthrown the bourgeoisie 
and had seized power would not have permitted the bour- 
geoisie to enjoy the possession of the means of produc- 
tion undisturbed. The proletariat ruled in the country 
and could not possibly have permitted the bourgeoisie to 
rule on the economic field and live accordingly. 

In April, 1918, in a fine speech by Comrade Lenin, the 
Soviet government attempted to define our next tasks 
and to point out the way which we now designate as "The 
new economic policy". It attempted to conclude agree- 
ments with the capitalists and to transform private capi- 
talism into capitalism controlled by the proletarian state. 
Comrade Lenin said that we must learn from the trust 
kings how to reconstruct our industries. At the same 
time the Soviet government had to act in just the opposite 
manner in the country, where the prerequisites for So- 
cialism were not present. In order to obtain grain it had 
to arm the workers and the village poor, and to form 
village committees against rent-profiteering. Capitalism 
which had been destroyed by the war had not left us suffi- 
cient means for the exchange of manufactured articles 
for grain. The Soviet government was not yet sufficiently 
fortified, and was in control of too weak a machine to be 
able to get grain by means of the tax in kind. The peas- 
ants, who had thrown off ^the yoke of the large landowners, 
the Czar and the bourgeoisie with the aid of the workers, 
wanted no restrictions set upon their freedom. They 
desired a free stateless life, with no obligations to the 
workers' and peasants' government. The grain producers 
were willing to exchange their grain only for the greatest 
possible part of those goods which were still in the coun- 
try; this would have injured the state, the working class 
and the poor villagers. 



13 



But the third class, the bourgeoisie, did not want to 
hear of limitations either. It refused to accept the com- 
promise with the Soviet government, as offered by Lenin 
in 1918. With the aid of the world bourgeoisie, it had be- 
gun the fight for life against Soviet Russia. During the 
summer of 1918 the united Russian bourgeoisie declared 
at one time to Lithuania, another time to Poland, a third 
tim.e to Esthonia, then to the Ukraine and Germany, re- 
spectively, that thanks to the protection of German im- 
perialism it was not compelled to accept the compromise, 
with the Soviet government. After the Czecho-Slovak 
uprising, particularly after the Allies had defeated Ger- 
many, the Russian bourgeoisie, basing its hopes upon aid 
from the Allies, started the most bitter struggle against 
the Soivet government. It refused to lease its enterprises 
because it hoped to retain them as its property. In order 
to make it possible, therefore, to carry out the new eco- 
nomic policy, it Was necessary to knock the bourgeoisie 
down, not only in law, but in fact. It had to be knocked 
on the head in a two years' war. 

We had to prove to the bourgeoisie and to world capital 
that the Russian industries belonged to the proletarian 
state and not the bourgeoisie. We had to do this before 
we could make use of the bourgeoisie in the further de- 
velopment of production. The war inevitably brought 
about a complete nationalization. This nationalization 
was brought about not only by the necessity of destroying 
the ruling class and ending its political power, which was 
based upon economic power; we had to nationalize for 
other reasons also. We had to nationalize because it 
would otherwise have been impossible to carry on the 
war begun by the bourgeoisie. Our unlimited centraliza- 
tion was nothing more than the stripping of the whole 
country in order to obtain all the industrial products nec- 
essary for carrying on war. As Comrade Lenin rightly 
states in his pamphlet on the tax in kind, the military 
measures led to military Communism in the cities, and to 
requisitioning in the country, that is, to grain-plundering 



14 




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15 



for the support of the army and the cities. Was there 
any other possibility of getting a sufficient amount of 
metal and of grain which we needed for the war? We 
could not possibly have left our limited stores of manu- 
factured goods to the discretion of the speculators. And 
how could we possibly have left grain to be taken care of 
by the tax in kind, when we lacked the necessary govern- 
ment apparatus for computing this tax correctly? The 
grain stores of Central Russia (until 1919 Siberia and the 
Ukraine did not belong to us) were so small that it was 
not possible to obtain any surplus whatever; moreover, 
the peasants could receive nothing in return for this sur- 
plus on the free market, if there was any, because all the 
manufactured goods were confiscated. 

Outside of the political, strategic and economic necessity 
for the policy of war Communism, there was another 
social-psychological factor. If even at the beginning of 
the revolution the victor class could not leave the material 
sources in the hands of their enemy and thus enable the 
bourgeoisie to lead a life of luxury in a legal manner, how 
then could the proletariat have possibly done this at a time 
when Russia was one big battlefield, when the workers 
and peasants had to undergo so much suffering in order 
to be victorious in their fight against the bourgeoisie? 
Was it possible, at a time when the hungry and freezing 
women workers were sewing coats for the army day and 
night and under poor light, to permit beautifully lit and 
rich displays in the stores to mock the suffering fighters 
by showing them how well the bourgeoisie lived and en- 
joyed life ? This was impossible ! The Soviet government 
had to institute the Spartan manner of living, because it 
was the only one which corresponded to the gray soldier 
coat of Soviet Russia. 

War Communism was a contradiction to the structure 
of Russia and its economic relations. War Communism 
was a contradiction as far as the land was concerned ; in 
the cities, however, the possibility of success was not alto- 



16 



gether excluded. If the world revolution had come as 
early as 1910, before the disarming of the European work- 
ing class took place, or even in 1920, during our advance 
towards Warsaw, the reconstruction of the Russian large 
industries as a whole on the basis of state ownership and 
accordmg to our economic plans would not have been 
historically impossible. The Soviet government could 
then have thought of retaining the large industries as a 
whole in its own hands, because it could have received 
the necessary machines from the European workers. Even 
in case the world revolution had not been victorious on a 
European scale, even if we had only conquered Poland 
and then stood armed at the gates of Germany, it would 
not have been altogether impossible to force the bour- 
geoisie to accept a compromise with us after we would 
have gotten the means of production from the world bour- 
geoisie for our industries in European Russia, in return 
for concessions in the bordering regions of Russia, — Sibe- 
ria, Caucasus and Turkestan — and for the right to develop 
production in these distant regions on the basis of con- 
cessions. 

What would then have been the social relations in Rus- 
sia under such circumstances? All the industries and 
means of transportation would have been in the hands of 
the workers. The land would have been in the hands of 
the peasants. The reconstructed industries would have 
made it possible for the proletariat to relinquish the requi- 
sitions in the country, and to receive grain partly through 
the tax in kind and partly by exchanging goods with the 
state industries. This would have been no Communism, 
but it would have been the most significant step in the 
transition towards Socialism ; it would have led the way 
towards great progress in electrification, and towards 
creating the necessary conditions for the advante of the 
peasantry towards a higher collectivistic system of pro- 
duction. 



17 



In -this we did not succeed. The long-drawn-out civil 
war has weakened us economically. Now that it is at an 
end we cannot proceed in industrial production, although 
our compromise with the world bourgeoisie is advan- 
tageous to us. The uncertainty of our foreigns relations 
gave the bourgeoisie the opportunity of getting greater 
concessions from us and of starting the negotiations for 
concessions under conditions which were less favorable 
to us. We must therefore first permit the restoration of 
the small and middle sized industries on the basis of lease. 
This will of course restore a part of the Russian bour- 
geoisie. We are compelled to grant concessions under less 
favorable conditions. We must grant concessions in Cen- 
tral Russia ; we must permit foreign capital to start those 
factories running which are already there, instead of de- 
veloping those productive sources which have not yet 
been used. Our present task is to retain the main in- 
dustrial undertakings in the hands of the workers' gov- 
ernment. We are consciously preparing ourselves for 
co-operating with the bourgeoisie; this is undoubtedly 
dangerous to the existence of the Soviet government, be- 
cause the latter loses the monopoly on industrial produc- 
tion as against the peasantry. 

.: Does not this signify the decisive victory of Capitalism? 
May we not then speak of our revolution as having lost 
its revolutionary character? Were all our efforts and the 
whole three years' struggle a futile sacrifice? 

We shall begin with this last question. The whole 
course of development has shown that the bourgeoisie 
would not have had to become our lessees, if we had not 
beaten them on the economic field, if we had not expropri- 
ated them, because they were owners of the means of 
production. If we had not beaten them there would be 
no talk of concessions. But if, as we have said, our eco- 
nomic policy of 1920 was necessary for our victory, it 
was also a necessary condition for our new economic 
policy. 

18 - 



, \ V^ '=°""*''^' °" Po'i'^y "f requisitioning could 
only have been a transition policy. Even in case th? wor W 
proletariat had been victorious we would have rehn 
quished It On the industrial field our present concessions 
are only temporary transition concessions; by this we 
certamly do not mean that at the end of a year we shlu 
agam confiscate the newly accumulated goods Our eco 
nomic policy is based upon a longer ceriod nf h„o k I 
It IS a transition Policy 'ieverthelfss.^Ouf goal TeSain 
the same-the industries in the hands of fhe woSfer" • 
government But just at present the government indus- 
tnes constitute only a part of the total industries; they 
only form a narrow foundation for the proletarian gov- 
r.TT; What does that mean? It means that we have 
retreated; that we are holding those positions only which 
are necessary to maintain the power of the workers and 
peasants. 

n.^rK^fjrl'' ^-^'^.f ' ^^^«l"t^«^ i« ^ non-Socialist 
one? _ No! It only signifies that the victorious workins: 
class IS not able to carry out its program completely, not 
even that program which in Russia, a petty-bourgeois 
country, seems theoretically possible. But the class 
which must retreat because of the great resistance of 
the other classes, in our case because of the resistance 
of world capitalism which is not yet overthrown, does 
not cease to be the victorious class, the ruling class 
When the Czarist regime, which was a government of 
large landowners, was compelled to make concessions to 
capitalism, so that the bourgeoisie became the ruling eco- 
nomic class, Czarism itself did not cease to exist and the 
large landowning class did not cease to be the ruling 
political class; neither did Russia cease to be a country 
of half-serfdom. Should the bourgeoisie of Europe at- 
tempt to hinder the revolution by submitting to state 
capitalism and even to workers' control, it will not cease 
to be the ruling class. We now come to the last question. 
It is not a question of the character of our revolution. 
The revolution was consummated by the working class 

19 



and will go down in the annals of history as a Socialist 
revolution, even though the Russian working class may 
temporarily be defeated. We are rather speaking of the 
outcome, the result of the revolution. 

Will the Bolsheviki retain their power under the con- 
ditions of the partial restoration of capitalism and the 
production of goods by the peasants ? Our enemies point 
out that economic relations determine the political ones, 
and that economic concessions like the ones we grant to 
the bourgeoisie, must lead to political concessions. 

This so-called Marxian ABC has nothing in common 
with Marxism, because it is abstract and considers 
neither time nor space. Should world capitalism con- 
stantly gain power in the course of many years, and the 
revolution constantly weaken, then the working class 
must in the long run be defeated. But when a large land- 
owning class in Russia made economic concessions to the 
bourgeoisie, it nevertheless continued in power for quite 
a long time. It is true that the economic concessions 
were followed by political concessions and finally by the 
capitulation of the large landowning class. But the rea- 
son for this lies in the fact that the large landowning 
class was the end of a decaying branch of development; 
it was a dying class. From this point of view the bour- 
geoisie is the historically deteriorating, dying class. That 
is why the working class of Russia can refuse to make 
political concessions to the bourgeoisie; since it is justified 
in hoping that its power will grow on a national and in- 
ternational scale more quickly than will the power of the 
Russian bourgeoisie. 

The history of the Russian revolution establishes .the 
fact that it was the first Socialist and the first proletarian 
revolution. It is a proletarian revolution in a petty bour- 
gaois country. For this reason it will distinguish itself 
from the proletarian revolutions in countries like Eng- 
land and America by the fact that after a long struggle, 
followed by the seizure of power, the working class of 



20 



these countries will be able to carry out their programs 
much more quickly than we have been. Ours is a prole'- 
tarian revolution which under unfavorable inner and outer 
conditions advances like every other revolution. But it 
is a proletarian, a Socialist revolution; the tradition of 
October is the program of the world revolution. 

October is not the anniversary of the Comedy of Errors 
in which, as the Mensheviki claim, the working class un- 
consciously became the tool of another class. It is the 
anniversary of the beginning of the great international 
proletarian revolution. Even now when we are fighting 
in our defensive positions we count the sacrifices of our 
struggle and can say with absolute conviction and ease, 
"We followed the right in October and the victory is 
ours." 



^^^% 






21 



The Author 



Radek is a member of 
the Centra] Executive 
Committee of the Rus- 
sian Communist Party 
and of the Third Interna- 
tional. Still a young man, 
he is a seasoned veteran 
in the labor movement 
and one of the most pow- 
erful and striking figures 
in the Russian revolu- 
tion. He was born in Ga- 
licia. Radek's specialty 
is the international 
phases of the Communist 
movement and a dreaded 
opponent in debate. A 
favorite pastime of his 
is to show delegates from 
various countries how much more he knows about their 
own labor movements than they do. He has, as usual, 
command of several languages. As a speaker he is par- 
ticularly forceful, although not eloquent. I considered 
it a real compliment to him when a couple of interpreters 
who were translating for the English section complained 
that they had to take down almost verbatim what he said, 
whereas they could let other speakers ramble along for 
ten. minutes at a time without making any notes. 

WILLIAM Z. FOSTER. 




R&dek. 



22 



plll!l!l!llllllllllllllllllllllll!lllll!illllllillll!illl!llllllllllliill!ll!l!llllllililillli!lll!lll!l!l^ 

i "At Ramikovsky in Soviet Russia the people are 1 

1 eating their dead. It is dangerous to bury the i 

M famine victims in the presence of the people, and | 

1 guards are kept over them until they are in a state 1 

1 that makes eating impossible." 1 

1 Blame the Famine ! Blame the Blockade ! 1 

= Blame the Coimter-Revolution ! M 




YOUR DOLLARS 
WILL SAVE 

LIVES! 

Send Dollars So That No Blame Rests Upon You ! 

A. B. MARTIN, National Secretary 
201 West 13th Street - - New York City 



rriilllllllllllilllllll 



lillll!lillllilllillli!lll!l!l!llllll!!lllli!lll!l!illll!lllllllllll!llllll!illlllilllll!llllllill!^ 



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